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I. INTRODUCTION
Within a relatively short time, the concept of law in many
developing countries has begun to evolve from that of a reflection
of the customs, beliefs and ethics of a people toward that of an in-
strument at the service of the state. Increasingly, law has become
associated with development, modernization, social change and, on
occasion, revolution. Disaffection with the slow pace of change
mounted, beginning in the 1960's, as governments recognized that
the strategies of development espoused by the economic purist-
of capitalist or socialist persuasion-did not, in the final analysis,
incorporate sufficient reference to the complexities involved in
social and economic change. Consequently, the relation between
law and development has gained currency and has become a more
sharply defined, respectable and legitimate concern, as have the
relations between development and other disciplinary perspec-
tives.'
Many developing countries have attempted to promote indus-
trial growth through the use of the discretionary powers of the
state as exercised through laws. Anxious to stimulate economic
growth and social modernization through industrialization, this
new use of law was seen as a means of achieving developmental
goals while imposing what were thought to be appropriate norms
and procedures. This process of grafting a new legal order onto
the traditional society is perhaps nowhere more pronounced than
in the case of the creation, evolution and regulation of public
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' Within the social sciences it has long been felt that the economics discipline has over-
shadowed all others in the effort to bring about modernization and change in the traditional
societies. It is now recognized that the other disciplines may bring useful perspectives to
the various issues involved in development. However, there remains a strong tendency to
segment development issues along disciplinary lines rather than seek a multi- or interdisci-
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enterprises in the developing countries. Often relying heavily on
imported legal concepts, the developing countries have sought to
stimulate growth through the formation of public enterprise sec-
tors that-besides their economic function-also incorporate
social goals such as the redistribution of wealth, employment
generation and the provision of vital goods and services to society.
Thus, public enterprises frequently have been created to promote
those objectives believed to be consistent with the maximization
of social benefit but inconsistent with private profitability.
It is precisely because of the social as well as the economic char-
acter of public enterprises that a basic problem arises. The pur-
suit of social goals has often led developing countries to undertake
highly unprofitable projects. While social benefit may, indeed,
derive from such projects, it is more likely that the state and the
society will incur net welfare losses.2 A public enterprise, as an
economic unit required to perform its economic function effi-
ciently, is nevertheless also accountable to the state-a state
that often may pursue vague and unclear social objectives and feel
compelled to direct the firm's operations. The task facing the pub-
lic enterprise is, therefore, a complex one. The concomitant legal
problem is also complex, since the law must seek to define both
the task of the enterprise and its requisite performance. A proper
balance must be found between the various competing objectives
expected of the public enterprise; further, this balance must find
adequate expression in legal instruments to ensure achievement of
these objectives.
It is not surprising that law has been used extensively in the
creation of public enterprises and in seeking to define, in precise
legal terms, their roles, objectives and operations in sufficiently
detailed terms to mitigate any economic and social ambiguities as
to purpose and goal.' Law has both posed and attempted to
answer the basic question, i.e., whether the legal form of public
enterprise organization can be so constructed as to produce the
requisite managerial and employee behavior so that both the
social and economic ends are met.
' For a recent study on the performance experience of public enterprise sectors in a
number of developing countries, see Choksi, State Intervention in the Industrialization of
Developing Countries Selected Issues, WORLD BANK STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 41 (1979).
' The effort to legally define the social and economic purposes of public enterprises can
often prove quite extensive, particularly in .the socialist economies. See GOVERNMENT OF
YUGOSLAVIA, SECRETARIAT OF INFORMATION, THE ASSOCIATED LABOUR ACT, THE S.F.R. OF
YUGOSLAVIA ASSEMBLY SERIES (1977).
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There is mounting evidence in the developing world that law
has largely failed to produce that framework in which the per-
formance of public enterprises corresponds in sufficient measure
to their social and economic objectives. Increasingly, meeting
social objectives results in excessive and continuing economic
costs that, in the final analysis, only serve to weaken the economy
to such an extent that the social objectives are themselves under-
mined. The continuous subsidization of unprofitable firms, in the
long run, leads to a serious misallocation of resources brought
about by the diversion of national savings. Even if the financial
performance of an enterprise may improve over time, the net
welfare loss, evaluated over the total years of operation of the
firm, is still likely to be quite large. As a result, many countries
have found it necessary to review carefully the present condition
of their public enterprise sectors. Where redress is sought, it is
not unusual to find that reformulation of policies, operating styles
and goals is once again viewed mainly as a legal exercise.
Robert C. Pozen, in his recently published study on the Ghana-
ian experience with legal definition of the economic purpose of
public enterprises, observed that "legal decisions about state-
owned enterprises can be intelligently made only in reference to
the developmental strategies and other aims of each country ...
lawyers have no special claim to these decisions; the selection of a
developmental strategy belongs to the political leaders of each
country."' Perhaps this is true, but nevertheless law is at the core
of many current efforts in developing countries to once again ad-
dress what David Smith (in a review of Pozen's work) calls the
"political accountability-business efficiency double-decker bus."5
This article focuses on the use of legal instrumentalism as a
means of inducing acceptable public enterprise performance in the
Middle East, with particular reference to the Egyptian case.
Under Anwar Sadat, Egypt is seeking major reforms in and im-
proved economic performance from a public enterprise sector that
in the past has not made an adequate contribution to economic
development. The economy, in a precarious and seriously weak-
ened condition, is saddled with a public enterprise sector that has
incurred substantial and continuing losses for over a decade. The
outcome of this "reformation" will have considerable influence on
the other Arab countries, including Syria, Iraq, the Sudan and the
R. POZEN, LEGAL CHOICES FOR STATE ENTERPRISES IN THE THIRD WORLD 141 (1976).
Smith, Book Review, 27 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 597 (1979) (R.
POZEN, LEGAL CHOICES FOR STATE ENTERPRISES IN THE THIRD WORLD).
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Gulf States, that have patterned their industrialization on the
Egyptian model.'
The interplay between law and economics, the lawyer and the
economist, in this process of public enterprise reform will also be
examined. The Egyptian case is once again appropriate, for law
and lawyers have played a predominant role in revitalizing its
public enterprises. The problem of making public firms more
economically efficient remains. But, in addition, they must con-
tinue to be legally responsible for maintaining past gains in social
justice. The outcome will be particularly significant for other
developing countries, such as India, Mexico, Turkey and Ghana,
which are also increasingly aware of the high costs involved in
perpetuating highly inefficient public enterprises but which must
remain committed to broad social objectives.
Finally, a number of recommendations will be put forth concern-
ing the use of law as an effective tool in the reformulation of pub-
lic enterprise goals or, for that matter, broader economic develop-
ment strategies and goals. There is a clear need to facilitate a
common frame of reference for the lawyer and the economist as
they address the basic issues involved in bringing about rapid
economic and social change. The current wave of concern over
public enterprise performance offers a new opportunity for cre-
ative and fresh approaches by both disciplines.
II. PUBLIC ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: AN OVERVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST EXPERIENCE
Public enterprise is a widespread and important component in
the development programs of the Arab countries. Although the
reasons for the adoption of public enterprises vary considerably,
several factors are relatively common to all Arab nations in the
Middle East. These factors include: the severe shortage of mana-
gerial and entrepreneurial talent; the existence of small private
sectors relatively inexperienced in putting together large and
complex industrial projects; and, in some instances (e.g., the oil
rich states), the accumulation of capital surpluses too large for a
private sector to absorb. Factors such as these have led govern-
' The influence of Egypt throughout the Arab World is extensive in all matters, but
especially so with respect to economic development strategy and policy. This influence,
aside from any historical origins, stems from the interventionist and Pan-Arab policies pur-
sued by Nasser and the fact that Egypt serves as a major source of professional labor for
many other Arab countries. Hence, economic planning organizations, educational institu-
tions and bureaucracies are often designed by and, on occasion, staffed with Egyptians.
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ments to create public enterprises to spearhead national develop-
ment.
A number of Arab countries (Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Sudan)
have, in addition to the factors noted above, felt compelled to
adopt a political and economic philosophy which is consistent with
widespread ownership of the means of production and with cen-
tralized direction of development. Others (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates), with a strong predilec-
tion for private enterprise, nevertheless have found that public
enterprise is a more expeditious form of inducing rapid industri-
alization. The latter countries show no indication of a socialist
policy nor have their public enterprise sectors been formed by the
large-scale nationalization of pre-existing foreign or domestic pri-
vate enterprises.
As might be expected, public enterprises in the Arab countries
of the Middle East assume a wide variety of legal and organiza-
tional forms. In addition, they are subject to a variety of forms of
official surveillance, direction and accountability. Laws pertaining
to dispute settlement, labor relations, taxation and liability differ
from country to country, largely depending upon the legal struc-
ture of the enterprise.
Given the great diversity of laws and legal arrangements that
one finds in Middle Eastern public enterprises, there is a surpris-
ing degree of commonality in the types of problems and issues
which arise.' In 1976, a conference on public enterprises and
development in the Arab countries generated a rather lengthy
list of the main areas of concern:
1. Inadequate articulation of the multiple objectives of public
enterprises (e.g., production of revenue, government control
of vital sectors of the economy, provision of public services,
training of administrative and technical personnel, employ-
ment, etc.);
2. The need to develop more adequate criteria of enterprise
performance;
3. Inadequate supervision and co-ordination at the policy level
and faulty organization and management at the operating
level;
Under the aegis of the Arab League, a number of technical committees and organiza-
tions have been established which focus upon key development issues with which the Arab
countries are confronted. There have been several major conferences on public enter prise
experience and, in general. there is a considerable interchange of information between
members of the League on economic and social matters.
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4. Failure to achieve proper balance between the requirements
of policy making and the requirements of management per-
formance;
5. The classic problem of control and autonomy and the com-
plexity of the notion of control, especially in mixed econo-
mies and joint international ventures (e.g., control may be
through ownership, management, technology, holding com-
panies, marketing, etc.);
6. Insufficient accountability of public enterprises, for exam-
ple, through legislative controls and public reports;
7. Decentralized planning at the enterprise level and the effec-
tualization of worker self- management;
8. The settlement of disputes between public enterprises, for
example, at the ministerial level or through arbitration; and
9. The inadequacy and unsuitability of traditional laws and
lawyers.8
Such concerns demonstrate the dichotomy between social objec-
tives and economic efficiency and the strong inclination of govern-
ments to seek resolution of any imbalance between these objec-
tives through a further delineation of the legal constructs of
public enterprises.
This particular conference concluded that "though a public
enterprise may have political and social objectives in addition to
its commercial ones, it ought to be evaluated in the first place by
ordinary commercial standards."9 If this were the case, then the
main criteria of performance must necessarily be real economic
costs "which reflect the economic value of all inputs and outputs of
the enterprise in terms of goods and services, taking into considera-
' Public Enterprises and Development in the Arab Countries, International Center for
Law in Development 5 (1977). These proceedings list additional issues which are more perti-
nent to the oil-producing Arab countries, including the extreme shortage of entrepreneurial
and managerial experience and the need to use public enterprises as training vehicles; the
overdependence on oil and the need for industrial diversification of public enterprise activi-
ties; and insufficient concern for economic efficiency, induced by the exhorbitant amount of
capital available.
With regard to the problem of control and autonomy, joint ventures between Arab public
enterprises and international investors and inter-Arab joint ventures has become a subject
of great interest and importance in the Middle East. The basic thrust of Egypt's economic
liberalization policy is towards the decentralization of public enterprises and the diminution
of public enterprise influence through the encouragement of joint ventures with Western
(primarily United States) private corporations. This is seen as a means of inducing greater
economic efficiency within the public enterprise sector and stimulating a more rapid pace of
technology transfer. Opponents of the new policy see it merely as a means of liquidating the
public enterprise sector and returning to an economy largely controlled and operated by
private interests.
9Id
[Vol. 10:2
19801 PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
tion the direct and indirect costs and returns, and endeavoring to
achieve the prescribed and implicit objectives with minimum costs
and optimum utilization of resources."" Further examination of
specific situations, however, indicates rather clearly that while
there may exist a pronounced desire to have efficiency criteria
form the principal basis of performance evaluation, many Arab
states continue to absorb considerable losses from economically
inefficient public enterprises. This trend is unabated by any at-
tempt at more precise legal definitions of goals, purposes and per-
formance criteria."
A. Syria
In the case of Syria, for example, the development of the public
enterprise sector corresponded to the process of the establish-
ment of independence from the French mandate as well as
economic development. The economic development strategy was
embodied in four development plans: 1961-65; 1966-70; 1971-75; and
the current plan of 1976-1980. Relying on a series of nationaliza-
tion measures-as did Egypt, Iraq and the Sudan-and beginning
with the nationalization of the finance sector in 1961, Syria issued
successive decrees in 1964 and 1965 to increase public control of
the main production and service facilities.2 By 1960, the public
10 Id
" A particularly interesting proposal was made at the conference on public enterprises
and development (see note 8 supra). It was suggested that where social objectives are main
tained for public enterprises they should receive a direct government subsidy equivalent to
the non-economic task(s) demanded of them by legal statute or other legal instruments
(such as a ministerial decree). Alternatively, it was suggested that the aggregate costs of
social tasks required of the firm should be calculated at the time of budget review and an
appropriate adjustment made in the annual financing of the firm to cover what in effect is a
social charge. Neither answers the issue of whether performing the social task indeed im-
pairs the achievement of the purely economic functions of public enterprises. For instance,
if a firm must employ 1,000 workers when it only needs 500 in order to maximize employ-
ment from a social standpoint, it must be recognized that the marginal product of the
unnecessary workers may well be negative: overcrowding of the workplace, make-work
projects and the like may well reduce the productiveness of that portion of the labor force
gainfully employed. Further, the calculation of the appropriate charge for social tasks is
often difficult to determine with any accuracy. Finally, such solutions are of little import for
the public enterprise that is inherently inefficient; i.e., many public enterprises have insuffi-
cient economic justification for their creation in the first place, much less their continued
existence.
" The private sector is small but active in the Syrian economy. Almost all large enter-
prises have been nationalized and those active in the private sector are careful not to grow
so significantly that they attract attention or become eligible for nationalization. Syria has
no specific criteria with respect to the latter, however, the private sector recognizes that "a
rule of thumb" is exactly that.
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sector was the leading contributor to national income, accounting
for forty-seven percent of gross domestic product (GDP); by 1974,
it accounted for seventy-five percent of total fixed capital invest-
ment.
Sweeping measures calling for nationalization of existing pro-
duction and service capacity generally preceded any serious
thought as to how, from a legal point of view, the public enter-
prise sector would be organized (again, a similar pattern prevailed
in Iraq, Egypt and the Sudan).13 In Syria, the nationalization phase
was completed in 1965. The issuance of reorganization and consoli-
dation laws and decrees has been more or less continuous since
that time, falling into three rather distinct phases:
1. The nationalization phase of 1963-1965, during which the
concept of a holding company was applied as basic in the
legal organization of the various nationalized enterprises;
2. The reorganization phase of 1966-1973, during which a sec-
toral system was followed, [e.g.], banks, industry, foreign
trade, domestic trade, etc.; in industry, the methods of hori-
zontal ... and vertical complementary were followed;
3. The phase of unification of the organization of public enter-
prises, initiated in 1974 [and continuing] with the enactment
of unified principles for organization of the public sector."
Continual legal redefinition of the structure of public enterprises
has been occasioned by the general failure to attain the economic
objectives set forth for the sector in the various development
plans.
For Syrian public enterprises, performance is evaluated within
the context of established long-range economic plans which are
enacted as laws. Under a "policy umbrella" established by the
" Early development plans in Syria and Egypt called for a substantial investment role on
the part of the private sector. For both countries, the 1961-1965 plan indicated that such a
role was both anticipated and expected. It is puzzling, therefore, to find that shortly after
these plans were launched both countries initiated a policy of nationalization of all major
private holdings. See Roy, Economic Liberalization and the Private Industry Sector in
Egypt, 1 MIDDLE EAST MANAGEMENT REVIEW 9, 10 (1977), for a further discussion of the
Egyptian experience in this regard.
" See note 8 supra, at 127.
Holding companies have been proven to be one of the more ineffectual organizing
vehicles for public enterprises in the Middle East. Initially, in countries like Syria, Iraq and
Egypt, their convenience lay largely in providing a loose managerial and administrative
framework within which to collect individual operating units with roughly similar product
lines. However, in practice what often occurred was the gathering together of individual
production units of vastly varying size, technologies, product lines, and management
methods. Effective administration and planning was virtually impossible in such situations.
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state planning authority (with appropriate political approval), each
project or enterprise submits an annual production plan to which
investment plans are attached. There is no coordination horizon-
tally; i.e., the short-range targets of each public enterprise are for-
mulated independently of one another. Within the enterprises,
targets are coordinated by the appropriate public institution to
which they report."
Performance, given the absence of any horizontal integration of
enterprise targets, can only stress two factors: the attainment of
investment objectives (i.e., spending allocated funds), and produc-
tion objectives. Since the enterprises are not required to prepare
budget estimates, the evaluation of their financial performance is,
in general, impossible. More importantly, performance evaluation
in terms of their economic profitability is not a reliable indicator
because the "bottom-up," or materials balancing, method of plan-
ning does not permit sufficient precision in the determination of
appropriate production levels and the corresponding appropriate
levels of enterprise investment. To this would have to be added
the difficulties which ensue from "the fluctuation of prices, the
mingling of profit with the surplus allocated for development, the
lack of proper development of the financial supervisory systems,
and the lack of a plan for costs and profits."1
The use of law, in the first instance, to establish a suitable
framework within which to rationalize the achievement of social
and economic objectives through the establishment and adminis-
tration of the public enterprise sector and, in the second, to adapt
to the exigencies which ensue from an inadequate or incorrect
assessment of the economic consequences involved therein, gener-
ally has not worked well in the Syrian case. Serious economic
problems have arisen which have created an imbalance between
the social and economic goals being sought.
For example, the level of production of consumer goods has not
kept pace with the money supply resulting in an increasing rate of
inflation. Rising prices have had an adverse impact on the real in-
comes of members of limited income groups. In addition, the
undermining of the value of Syrian currency has resulted in its de-
" Under such a system it was possible to calculate and assess internal, but not external,
economies and diseconomies that accrued to any individual enterprise activity. Lack of
planning integration thus carried with it the likelihood that inter-industry dependencies
could not be foreseen and hence that the resulting economic problems could not be cor-
rected.
" See note 8 supra, at 138.
1980]
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
preciation. The trade balance deficit has increased, adding to an al-
ready substantial drain on much needed foreign exchange reserves
precisely at the time when the ability to generate foreign exchange
earnings was also decreasing. 7 There has resulted an absolute de-
cline in the standard of living. The latter consequence is obviously
not consistent with the social objectives implicit or explicit in the
creation of the public enterprise sector.
Clearly, the laws which govern the Syrian public sector do not
lead in and of themselves to the selection of inappropriate mone-
tary policy. It can be argued that the cumbersome nature of
numerous regulations reduces the flexibility and ease with which
state enterprises can respond to the rapidly changing economic
conditions with which they may be confronted. Conversely, it can-
not be contended that the revision of laws which govern the public
sector necessarily will bring about the required changes, given
the fact of economic instability. Yet in the Syrian case, the re-
sponse has been mainly legalistic.
Operating under a series of distortions of the types noted
above, the marketplace gives signals which may evoke a legal re-
sponse. This typically occurs in the public enterprise sectors of
the Middle East. In Syria, improvements in economic performance
have been sought through legal revisions of operating methods,
including proposals for:
1. Revising the planning process that would lead to unified
planning among the enterprises as well as between all major
economic sectors (industry, transportation, foreign and
domestic trade, credit, etc.);
2. Rationalizing state development planning machinery so that
bureaucratic inconsistencies in its operation are reduced;
3. Strengthening planning and research in the state planning
authority and all ministries, public institutions, and public
enterprises; and
4. Integrating the annual planning exercise covering all
aspects of economic activity: production, distribution, ex-
change, consumption; this plan would unify sectoral and cor-
porate plans and serve as a control over operations, follow-
up, supervision, and accountability.18
Syria is basically an agrarian economy. Seasonal fluctuations in its cotton, grain, and
tobacco crops have a significant impact on its foreign exchange earnings capability and,
hence, on its balance of trade position.
'" See note 8 supra, at 155.
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B. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates
By way of a contrast, for the origins of the public enterprise
sector are substantially different, it is interesting to examine the
situation in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). 9 As
essentially single resource economies (oil), these countries are par-
ticularly vulnerable in the long run. The burgeoning surpluses of
capital, a relatively recent phenomenon, must be used to insure
continued national political and economic viability as their oil
reserves are depleted. This has led these governments to assume
a dominant role in the planning and direction of economic develop-
ment. What has emerged is an aggregate economy which is almost
wholly dependent upon the oil industry. Economic activity outside
of the oil industry is, in turn, almost wholly dependent upon the
government.
Traditional in national character and often rather fundamental-
ist in religious outlook, both countries have developed public
enterprises as a means of insuring both the establishment of an
adequate social infrastructure to serve the public at large as well
as to attain whatever diversification of the economy is feasible
and practical. Neither Kuwait nor the U.A.E. (nor Saudi Arabia,
for that matter) is committed to anything approximating social-
ism, but "based on the size of their public sectors, these countries
appear to be more socialist than many a country which is commit-
ted to socialism. '0
Virtually all public services -mail, telecommunications, electric-
ity and water, and transportation-are totally government
owned.21 These services are provided on a highly subsidized basis
according to a pricing system which is designed to attain the ob-
jective of "social advantage." In addition, these governments hold
a majority ownership in oil production and oil-related enterprises
(usually as joint ventures with Western firms). Beyond this, both
governments have undertaken a wide variety of other economic
activities.
" The United Arab Emirates are comprised of the Trucial States in the Persian Gulf ex-
cluding Qatar and Bahrain. While minor variations occur in the organization and perform-
ance (and the laws adopted therein) of public enterprises of Kuwait and U.A.E., the former
exerts great influence over the latter. Therefore, it is possible to address their experiences
collectively.
' See note 8 supra, at 10.
" An exception here is the state of Dubai, which is part of the United Arab Emirates.
Only the postal service is owned by the government- all other services are provided by the
private sector.
19801
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
While countries such as Syria and Egypt had substantial pri-
vate sectors which were capable of contributing to economic
development (albeit that they chose to sharply curb their role),
neither Kuwait nor the U.A.E. were so endowed, at least not in
sufficient strength to assume a major role in converting huge
capital flows into viable economic projects. However, the private
sectors in these countries have not construed the government role
in the development of the economy as inimical to their interests.
Public enterprises in the service categories are organized as
normal government departments administering monopolies. In-
dustry operations can fall into several organizational categories,
depending upon the extent of government ownership or the
degree (irrespective of the extent of ownership) to which the
government chooses or is able to participate in the actual operat-
ing decisions. Accordingly, the legal form of an organization can
take the form of a government company, a public corporation, or a
foreign joint venture. Less orthodox ideologically than Syria,
Kuwait and the U.A.E. show considerably more flexibility in the
type of organizational structure adopted in response to the cir-
cumstances and choices with which they are confronted. Although
both governments are prominent in establishing and implement-
ing economic development priorities, they nevertheless are not re-
quired to conduct the exercise within a holistic and consistent
ideological framework. One must bear in mind that in both of
these countries, public enterprises have been created to assist,
not to compete with or replace, private enterprises.
The legal documentation which establishes the various forms of
public enterprise organization specifies their objectives in general
terms. With respect to the issue of economic performance as com-
pared with social objectives, the degree to which either set of cri-
teria is applied varies according to legal form:
1. The objectives of government subsidiaries which are formed
in joint ventures with foreign partners are carefully defined
and commercial profitability is both accepted and expected
as the leading indicator of performance.
2. Government operations in the services sector have objec-
tives incorporated into the laws creating them. These objec-
tives are none too precise and are often expressed in rather
vague language specifying broad social purposes.
A somewhat crude "rule of thumb" is that the closer public par-
ticipation in an economic undertaking approximates a private
endeavor (in this case, the foreign joint venture), the more sharply
[Vol. 10:2
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defined are the acceptable criteria of performance; among these,
commercial profitability would rank very high. At the other end of
the spectrum, where industries or services are wholly owned and
operated by the government, the enabling legislation is far less
precise and rather vague; here, social criteria are predominant.
From a structural point of view, the organization of both the
foreign joint venture and the wholly-owned government corpora-
tion may bear striking similarities. Their economic performances,
however, can and do differ markedly.
The question of economic efficiency is placed in a different
perspective for the oil-rich Arab nations than it is for poor nations
such as Syria and Egypt. Yet the reluctance with which countries
such as Kuwait and U.A.E. have initiated public undertakings and
the intent to turn over such undertakings to the private sector
when feasible carries with it an obligation to adhere to some form
of efficiency criteria. Enabling legislation and the various legal
forms of enterprise that have emerged reflect this ambiguous atti-
tude toward efficiency. As might be expected, the ambiguity finds
expression in the management of those enterprises which operate
under vague social criteria.
With respect to the performance issue in Kuwait and the
U.A.E., two additional points are relevant:
1. Given the need to train nationals and in general develop
human resources, the need to transfer modern industrial
technology, and the need to diversify a single resource
economy, the contribution of government enterprises cannot
be calculated only in financial terms. The "profit motive" is
not the principal consideration.
2. Although the rate of return of such enterprises might be in-
consequential- possibly even zero or negative- other alter-
native uses of so large funds of capital may not have been
conducive to development objectives and goals."
Hence, in the capital surplus economies, vague social objectives
are both more affordable and perhaps as effectively addressed as
they can be.
The cases discussed thus far broadly establish the two poles of
public enterprise experience of the Arab countries and the man-
ner in which law relates to the organizational character of each.
Syria, committed to socialism, has undertaken to establish the
dominance of the public enterprise sector, eliminating or restric-
' See note 8 supra, at 52, 53.
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ting private activity so that all basic economic decisions rest with
the state. A highly centralized planning and administrative struc-
ture has been created to administer these enterprises and suc-
cessive periods of administrative and legal reform have sought to
elicit managerial and firm behavior consistent with the social and
economic goals established for the public sector.
The Persian Gulf states of Kuwait and the U.A.E. have been
drawn more reluctantly into the utilization of public enterprises
as a means of promoting economic development. However, the
capital rich character of their economies and the paucity of trained
and experienced human resources have nevertheless led to the
creation of extensive public economic operations. The social pur-
poses for which public enterprises have been created are possibly
more palatable because they are affordable and the broader goals
of training indigenous personnel and effecting a more rapid rate of
technology transfer transcend the goal of pure profitability. Put
another way, profitability is not measured solely according to the
standard measures of commercial gain. The private sector is not
threatened by the state's intent to establish public enterprises
and the state adopts the profit motive in those operations where it
appears to be more appropriate to do so, i.e., in foreign joint ven-
tures. As in the case of Syria, the law reflects the multiplicity of
purposes being served in the public sector and the legal form of an
enterprise corresponds to the social and economic intent of the
specific public undertaking.
III. THE REFORMULATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE
GOALS: THE CASE OF EGYPT
Perhaps in no other Arab country has there been such an ex-
haustive and comprehensive attempt to legally define, and rede-
fine, the goals and purposes of public enterprises as in the case of
Egypt. By the early 1970's, the bold economic and social initiatives
that Nasser had launched in the late 1950's had resulted in the
creation of a public enterprise sector, the basic problems of which
were so deeply entrenched that the some 150 official "administra-
tive revolutions" announced throughout the period had had little
or no measurable effect.23 This led President Anwar Sadat to at-
"3 Administrative reform programs, of both major and minor scope, are formulated by
the Egyptian government. Usually headed by a minister of state, such programs encompass
a sweeping mandate for bureaucratic reform and reorganization. A main difficulty has been
that those officially heading these programs have seldom commanded a sufficient amount of
power or enjoyed the degree of high level support required to bring about much change.
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tempt to resolve Egypt's economic problems by adopting a philos-
ophy which sought to preserve the gains in social justice and the
basic character of Arab socialism and also sought to re-establish a
sufficient degree of private incentive and initiative so that the
economy could once again establish a growth momentum. It was
recognized that this could not be achieved without a considerable
revamping of public enterprises."
In 1973, Egypt embarked on this new economic experiment, the
"infitah, ' 5 more commonly known as the Open Door Policy, in an
effort to revitalize the national economy. The main aim is to com-
bine Arab surplus capital, Western industrial technology and
Egyptian entrepreneurial and managerial talent and labor into a
development equation which would lead to economic growth." At
the core of Egypt's economic problems lay the body of ill-con-
ceived and poorly administered policies that had evolved since the
late 1950's. Sadat, sensing that fundamental changes in the opera-
tion of the economy could only come through renewed emphasis
on private initiative, set in motion an increasingly heated debate
The character of the Egyptian bureaucracy in terms of its pervasiveness and lethargy
makes radical administrative reform virtually impossible. At best, then, the continuing
parade of reform movements has only brought about marginal improvements.
" Sadats advisors were considerably influenced by the type of public enterprise organi-
zation to be found extant in the more moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and the U.A.E., i.e., the extensive use of foreign joint ventures. Revamping Egyptian public
enterprises along such lines held several potential advantages: economic performance cri-
teria could be applied with greater specificity; the oil-rich Arab states would be more at-
tracted to investment possibilities in such cases; both the managerial and production tech-
nology of the Western industrialized nations might be transferred more expeditiously and
effectively; and the social emphasis of public enterprises would not be lost entirely. As
such, Egypt was seeking to establish a revitalized public enterprise sector within the con-
text of a continuing socialism but consistent with a return to market economics sufficient to
make the public sector more efficient and productive. For a discussion of Arab oil-nation in-
vestment objectives in Egypt, see generally Proceedings of the Seminar on Investment
Policies of Arab Oil Producing Nations, Arab Planning Institute and Kuwait Economic
Society (July 1979).
Meaning, literally, "openness" or a return to a more "open" society. The implications of
the term go beyond an economic definition and encompass both a religious and political
note. Figuratively speaking, "infitah" corresponds to the renaissance or rebirth of the
Egyptian nation.
' A number of articles and papers have been written on Egypt's new economic policy.
See generally note 13 supra; Roy, Private Industry Sector Development in Egypt An
Analysis of Trend& 1973-1977, at 1 JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
11, 33 (Spring 1978); Salacuse, Egypt's New Law on Foreign Investment The Framework
for Economic Openness, 9 INT'L LAW. 647 (1975); Salacuse & Parnall, Foreign Investment
and Economic Openness in Egypt Legal Problems and Legislative Adjustments of the
First Three Years, 12 INT'L LAW. 759 (1978); Waterbury, The Opening Part I Egypt's
Economic New Look, 20 A.U.F.S. NORTHEAST AFRICA SERIES (1978), Public Versus Private
in the Egyptian Economy, 21 A.U.F.S. NORTHEAST AFRICA SERIES (1979).
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on the issue of private versus public control. Thus, the coming of
economic liberalization to Egypt represented to many the recogni-
tion of the fact that Arab socialism, as conceived and practiced by
the government during the Nasser era, had failed to bring about
the economic transformation that was so boldly envisioned. Set-
ting forth his perception of the economic future of the country in
what has become known as the October Paper, 7 Sadat initiated a
major reversal of an anti-private investment attitude that had
prevailed for some fifteen years.
The sequence of events leading the government in a socialist
direction with respect to the economic, political, and social devel-
opment of the country had begun in the early 1960's. The national-
ization of the private sector, first of the foreign owned enterprises
(in 1956) and subsequently of the domestically owned enterprises
(in 1960 and 1961) and the imposition of strong government control
in virtually all aspects of the economic life of the country had
given a decided socialist orientation to its future development.
The bureaucracy which was created to manage the economy evi-
denced little ability to cope with the rapid increase in its responsi-
bilities.
Egypt's adventure in the Yemen in 1962 and its defeat there, as
well as in the 1967 War, proved extremely costly and effectively
limited a promising trend toward economic growth. Nasser's poli-
cies exacted increasing prices in domestic terms that the popula-
tion was unwilling to pay. The strains placed on the economy by
rapid population growth, the decay and breakdown of domestic
services and the growing disaffection with a ruinous international
policy increased the political pressure on Nasser to redirect the
energies of the government. The pressure was to liberalize not
only the economy but the society at large.
The interaction of these various pressures and the increased ac-
cumulation of Arab capital among the oil-rich nations ultimately
led Nasser's successors to re-examine past policies regarding for-
eign investment in Egypt and to question the likelihood that the
bureaucracy could ever effectively provide central direction and
stimulation to an economy so beset with major problems. Never-
theless, care had to be exercised in continuing to nurture the im-
age of the state as a protector of the poor and underprivileged,
thereby preserving the gains of the Nasser era in terms of the at-
mosphere of social justice which prevailed at that time.
"7 For the text of the October Paper, see al-Ahram al Iqtisadi, supplement, May 1, 1974.
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It is not surprising, then, that in discussing his philosophy of
the future economic and political development of the country,
Sadat has had to admonish those who sensed a greater change
than was intended: "There are some people who try to depict the
economic 'opening' as a basic change in our ideological framework,
that is our socialism; but this is a grave error."' Sadat, keenly
aware of the extent to which this policy would prove unpopular
with those with vested interests, has gone to great lengths to indi-
cate that private investment would not compete directly with the na-
tionally owned enterprises. Rather, liberalization would establish
a framework within which modern (i.e., Western) industrial tech-
nology could be transferred to Egypt and coupled with Arab
capital and Egyptian manpower and resources. It was believed
that such a transfer of technology would have positive effects on
the economic performance of the public sector companies and
result in a substantial reduction of the degree to which the
bureaucracy controlled the operation of the economy from a cen-
tralized vantage point. This is the critical, if not central, theme to
the policy of liberalization.
A. The Legal Framework of Egyptian Public Enterprises
It was noted that, in the case of Syria, the establishment of the
public sector through nationalization of private interests preceded
the formulation of any ideological or legal framework within
which to operate these new public entities. Egypt had a similar
experience, as a 1970 Rand Corporation study of the public sector
notes:
The public sector . . . evolved without a pre-planned policy-
from a period of traditional economic freedom, characterized by
small scale government direct investment, to a period of
directed capitalism, in which the growth of the public sector was
due mainly to Egyptianization of foreign assets, to the present
[1970] period of socialism, characterized by nationalization and a
defined role of the public sector.'
28'Id
S. FARID, Top MANAGEMENT IN EGYPT: ITS STRUCTURE, QUALITY, AND PROBLEMS 5 (1979)
(Rand Corporation). Egypt has pursued a course of state capitalism in which enterprises
were expected to play an economic role similar to that of a private sector. It was assumed
that the state was better able to articulate and manage large-scale and complex develop-
ment projects. Hence, the government, initially at least, did not seek to eradicate the initia-
tive that one might find in private capitalism. Rather, it sought to collectivize this initia-
tive.
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Hence, the formation of the public sector antedated the creation of
any definition of national socialism.
The non-ideological definition of the public sector did not long
remain. The National Charter of Arab Socialism, issued in 1962,
sought to define more sharply the role of public enterprises in the
future economic (and political) development of the state:
1. Social overhead capital, such as railways, highways,
airports, energy, dams, means of sea, land, and air
transportation, and other public utilities must be under
the public sector.
2. Heavy and medium industries and most of the mineral
industries must be under the public sector. Private
ownership might be allowed, but it should be subject to
control by the government. Light industry is allowed
as long as it is not a monopoly and provided that the
public authority directs it toward public interest."
3. Import trade must be fully controlled by the state. The
private sector may have a share, however, of up to 25
percent in the export trade. In domestic trade, the
public sector must have a share of 25 percent in order
to prevent monopoly.
4. Banks and insurance companies must be under the
public sector.31
While agriculture remained largely a private activity,32 industry,
trade, finance and the public services sector were placed under
the direction of the state.33
11 Investments in the private sector must register with the Ministry of Industry, General
Organization for Industrialization. A Private sector company applies to the Industrial
Licensing Department for approval of projects involving the establishment of new produc-
tive facilities or the expansion of existing plant where the investment exceeds LE 8,000.
Projects of less than this amount come under the supervision of the High Committee for
Handicrafts and Artisans. Within the private sector, the generally accepted guideline when
a firm might be considered for nationalization was fifty employees. Once a private company
went beyond this figure, it was generally believed that it would attract the attention of the
authorities. In practice, several private industrial undertakings considerably exceeded this
number; one private textile plant employed as many as 400 workers.
", See note 29 supra, at 5.
32 Even though the agricultural sector is essentially private, the government is active
both in providing inputs such as fertilizers, seeds, and equipment at subsidized prices and
in controlling the prices of outputs, largely through agricultural cooperatives. The overall
effect has been to severely limit private discretion and initiative.
" Although a good deal has been written about the ideological strains prevalent in Egypt
during the decade of the 1960's as it sought to industrialize under the name of "Arab Social-
ism," in effect the economy has maintained at least the semblance of a mixed character
since that time. By 1973, the private industry sector accounted for approximately 37 per-
cent of total industrial output in Egypt according to Ministry of Planning figures. See note
15 supra, at 9-17.
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Organizationally, the public enterprises were combined along
sectoral lines; within each sector, industries and services were
further grouped by field of activity. A corporation could consist of
a single plant or service operation. However, a holding corpora-
tion was more frequently used, which administered combinations
of related product lines.34 Each industry group was administered
by the appropriate ministry (e.g., the Egyptian Electrical Corpora-
tion was managed by the Ministry of Electricity).
The line of authority, responsibility and direction of each enter-
prise proceeded from the Ministry, which was responsible for im-
plementation of national political policy and economic develop-
ment plans, to the holding corporation, which had the vaguely
defined responsibility to act as "the Minister's apparatus for help-
ing him.., discharge his responsibilities,"35 to the board of direc-
tors of the individual state enterprise, which was responsible for
actual production and related economic and social objectives." To
the extent that specific criteria of performance were adequately
articulated and enunciated in the various public enterprise laws
and regulations, they related primarily to the direct management
functions performed within the economic production units.
Prior to the establishment of the new economic policy, state
economic activities could take the following forms:
1. State-owned corporations: independent units carrying
out economic, industrial and commercial, financial, and
agricultural functions, and related services such as con-
struction and transportation;
2. Government agencies or bureaus: administrative units
charged with directing basic social services and certain
economic activities such as managerial and financial
auditing of state enterprises and other bureaucratic
organizations; and
3. Associated companies: wholly state owned or state ma-
jority joint ventures administered by foreign interests.
The establishment and administration of these com-
panies were subject to the laws regulating public cor-
porations.
In 1964, the public banking sector was reorganized so that each of the five public banks
was responsible for the financing needs of specific sectors (e.g., the National Bank of Egypt
handled all foreign trade transactions).
" See note 29 supra, at 7.
" Law No. 32, 1966. See also ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, THE GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR IN-
VESTMENT AND FREE ZONES, LAw No. 43 OF 1974 CONCERNING THE INVESTMENT OF ARAB AND
FOREIGN FUNDS AND FREE ZONES AS AMENDED BY LAw No. 32 OF 1977 art. 3(i). Published of-
ficially in Official Gazette, June 9, 1977.
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After 1973, a number of modifications were introduced which
significantly altered or modified several of these forms."
As in the case of Syria, the objectives to be pursued by the pub-
lic enterprise sector in Egypt are formulated through a develop-
ment planning exercise, even though after the disastrous 1967
War any long-range planning was difficult to conduct effectively.
These objectives are defined each fiscal year, with the draft an-
nual plan originating in the public enterprise. This first phase of
planning emphasized the commodities to be produced, the quanti-
ty scheduled for production and the investment (in local and
foreign currencies) required to achieve these objectives.
The public authority which supervises the activities of the pub-
lic companies within its purview must simultaneously seek to
determine the needs of all other economic sectors which will con-
sume the commodities produced. Thus, raw materials, labor, capi-
tal and foreign exchange are balanced within the firms comprising
a sector as well as among the various economic sectors. The indi-
vidual company must conduct its planning with regard to the com-
mitment to meet the goals of producing strategic commodities (for
national defense), for public consumption, or for the production
needs of other public companies (i.e., intermediate capital goods)."
Individual company, industry sector, and economic and social
sector plans are then incorporated into a national program for pro-
duction and investment. The state's general plan and its imple-
mentation are governed by law. 9 Public institutions and public
sector companies are, accordingly, legally required to carry out
the programs, projects and general objectives of the approved
plan. Companies also are required by law to reach all of the plan's
goals according to a time schedule affixed thereto. In particular,
the companies are required to realize:
Semi-independent public commissions replaced government agencies. Legally, they have
complete independence and have a special budget similar to the general budget of the state. Two
new categories of associated companies were established: that with joint ownership by the state
and the foreign private sector (i.e., a foreign joint venture), and that with joint ownership by the
state and the Egyptian private sector. See Law No. 111, 1975, at art. 50 (law related to the
reorganization of government agencies).
In periods of highly limited resource availability, as Egypt has had to operate under in
recent years, it follows that the final allocation of resources is often a matter of political
bargaining. Consequently, even if the national planning framework was well conceived, dis-
tortions would inevitably occur because resource allocation was significantly affected by
political power distribution. Only where economic priorities corresponded to the presence
of political influence might one expect a positive outcome in purely developmental terms.
" Law No. 70, 1973, at art. 12 (in effect, the enabling act for five year development plans).
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1. The investment targets for investment projects within the
expenditure estimated in the plan;
2. The objectives of commodity production and services, quali-
tatively and quantitatively, considering the averages of pro-
duction requirements;
3. The objectives of the plan in relation to salaries and work
productivity; and
4. The objectives regarding imports and exports, as they ap-
pear in the plan. °
From an administrative standpoint, plan performance within the
public company is evaluated quarterly and annually by the super-
vising government institution, the ministry supervising the hold-
ing companies and the Ministry of Planning. 1
It must be borne in mind that while all of the relationships de-
scribed thus far are legally defined, there exists the most complex
problem of insuring that the economic signals passing within and
between all economic activities and sectors do not undermine the
achievement of these company duties and responsibilities. The
successfully administered economy must, therefore, develop ap-
propriate pricing, production and investment policies that abet,
rather than detract from, managerial performance with regard to
their responsibilities. It is precisely here that the lack of bureau-
cratic expertise is so readily evident in the Egyptian economic
and social development experiment.
B. Economic and Managerial Performance Under the Legal
Framework
Given the past and continuing attempt to legally define the
macro- and micro-economic and social objectives of public enter-
prises in a manner that would elicit the desired performance and
management behavior, what has been the actual experience in
Egypt?
It has been argued that, in the Egyptian case, it is unfair to ap-
ply the traditional return on investment criterion as the sole yard-
stick of performance. As long as the market was not allowed to
operate to determine the products and services to be demanded
40 See note 8 supra, at 73-74.
Article 17 of Law No. 70, 1973 stipulates: "Regular quarterly and annual reports are
presented by Ministries, Commissions, public institutions, public systems, and regional
units, to the Ministry of Planning, including the progress toward the achievement of the
plans and objectives." Supra note 39.
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and supplied, the allocation and distribution of productive re-
sources, and the prices at which goods and services were to be ex-
changed, a purely economic definition of return on investment
would prove somewhat meaningless. However, even allowing for
the need for other criteria of performance, the evidence strongly
suggests that many state enterprises have, for years, incurred
both substantial economic losses and have achieved only some-
what marginal accomplishments socially."2 Attributable to many
factors, not all of which lie within the control of the management
of public sector companies, this situation has had significant nega-
tive effects on the growth of the economy.
Industry growth and the contribution of the industrial sector to
Gross Domestic Product virtually stagnated after 1965. Account-
ing for about twenty-one percent of GDP, this share has remained
constant until 1975. Real GDP. growth was around two percent
from 1965 to 1974. Since then it has shown considerably better
growth but this has not been due to marked improvement in the
economic performance of the public sector. Industrial output in
the period 1965 to 1974 fluctuated between a negative growth rate
up to four percent. Labor productivity has been uniformly low in
public sector companies, largely as a result of overemployment
(estimates range as high as a 6:1 ratio of labor redundancy), inade-
quate training, lack of incentives, an excess of technical and mana-
gerial personnel, and poor organization of the labor force.
From the time of the inception of the public sector, the govern-
ment has attempted to determine administratively price-product
relationships. Lacking sufficient economic expertise and experi-
ence to orchestrate the multiplicity of complex relationships in-
volved, major portions of the public sector have lapsed into a pat-
tern of inefficient operation, conducted at a relatively high cost
and producing low quality goods. The impediments stemming
from the pursuit of inadequate and inappropriate economic
measures have led to the further development of constraints in
the environment: excessive bureaucratic and legal procedures;
price controls that were often unevenly applied and contradictory;
intermittent and highly restricted availability of foreign ex-
change;"3 an antiquated and oppressive system of taxation; restric-
" This is not to suggest that there has not been a positive social contribution by Egyp-
tian enterprises to overall economic development. However, the cost effectiveness of this
contribution is subject to question.
"3 The industrial sector is highly dependent upon imports of machinery, spare parts, and
raw materials. The lack of availability of foreign exchange in the economy led to unfulfilled
economic plans, severe depreciation of plant and equipment, and inadequate raw materials
to allow efficient use of established industrial plant.
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tive and counterproductive labor laws;" and weak institutional
support systems. The attempt to rectify these basic and funda-
mental shortcomings in the policy and bureaucratic environment
often took the form of a still further legal delineation of the
responsibilities and duties of the public sector. A labyrinth of con-
trols, regulations and policy directives grew up around the enter-
prises, with predictable results.
Quantitative controls proliferated, but increasingly represented
an inadequate response and an inappropriate approach to rectify-
ing the more deepseated and fundamental economic problems in
the country. Such controls could not have the desired effect,
either because of limitations inherent in the policy instruments
and their uses or because of the failure of policymakers to view
the corrective action needed in its totality. The necessary changes
in policies in support of quantitative controls did not take place.
The net effect, then, is that too much was asked of the policies in-
volved in establishing state control of the economy.
The difficulty of managing the economy was compounded by the
sheer number of policies and regulations that the authorities had
to administer and monitor. This accumulation of policies, old and
new, made it most difficult to evaluate accurately the cause and
effect of economic relationships. Subsequent corrective policy ac-
tion entailed a degree of bureaucratic sophistication, political sup-
port and economic management capability that simply did not
exist. As difficulties increased, with the policy package more
gerrymandered and the managerial capability in situ overtaxed, it
was inevitable that a high degree of randomness entered into the
interpretative and implementative phases of policy direction.
Policy makers became crisis managers, short term in outlook and
"band-aid" in mentality; planning in the large was abandoned in
the press of planning in the small.
The major problems of management behavior which have arisen
in the public enterprises attest to the degree to which the further
promulgation of laws only serves to exacerbate the situation. As
already noted, an excessive number of government organizations,
such as ministries, authorities, agencies and departments, partici-
pate in the planning, decision making, project implementation and
" The most cited instance of a particularly odious government policy in the labor field is
the government's policy of guaranteeing a job to all college graduates. Largely politically
inspired, this policy results in the assignment of thousands of recent graduates with little
or no experience and little relevant education to government offices and companies. Irre-
spective of their needs, government units are nevertheless required to absorb this un-
wanted supply of labor.
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operation of the public companies." Even though one particularly
cumbersome aspect of this bureaucratic arrangement was re-
moved in January, 1976, when the general holding companies
were abolished, plant managers have found that the plethora of
rules, regulations and policies to which their enterprises are sub-
jected has not changed."
With the centralization of authority and decision making has
come a decided lack of managerial incentive to improve and in-
crease productive efficiency and profitability. This lack of incen-
tive is perpetuated by the government's policy of taking profits
away from the efficient firm (either to finance the inefficient firm
or provide additional resources for the National Budget) or ab-
sorbing such profits by making a change in the relation of their in-
put and output prices. 7 The result is that the large majority of
enterprises are ineffectively managed. Their subjection to fixed
input and output prices, with the consequent difficulty of making
and keeping profits, is a leading cause.
An additional source of management frustration is the govern-
ment's labor policy, which virtually guarantees employment and
job security to all workers. This policy has been pursued since
1961.48 It is impossible for management to dismiss a worker except
" Presidential Decree No. 3546, 1962 (related to organization of public enterprise com-
panies), established a highly centralized decision making process but one in which there was
no clearly defined pattern of authority. Authority and responsibility being vague, enter-
prise managers would seldom be willing to exercise any individual judgment or discretion.
Rather, they tended to push all decisions upward through the organizational heirarchy.
Law No. 32, 1966, clarified to some extent the question of authority. However, the flexi-
bility which it allowed managers at the plant level was often proscribed by the political
risks inherent in exercising one's own judgment.
" The General Organizations (holding companies) were replaced by Supreme Councils.
These large boards meet only once a year and do little more than collect statistics; hence,
they play a much less active role in the day-to-day operation of the enterprises.
" Such changes in the prices of any given firm's raw materials and other inputs or the
prices of final products are made with no reference to their possible impact on other
economic activities. A profitable firm would have its prices altered to abolish its profits.
Whether or not this change impacts on other firms is simply not considered.
48 See, e.g., Law No. 91, 1959 (labor law) and Law No. 61, 1971 (amending Law No. 91).
Law No. 61, governing public sector employee performance, is indicative of Egypt's labor
policy. Article 16 provides for periodic rating of employees. Those who are graded average
or lower must be notified in writing and have a right to appeal, in writing, within two
weeks. The appeal is sent to the Chairman of the Board of Directors, who must make a final
decision within one month. When the Chairman decides that an employee's grades are
below average for two consecutive reporting periods, the employee can be transferred to
another job (which suits his abilities). Two consecutive poor grades leads to the employee's
being downgraded and to the lowering of his salary (but the cut cannot exceed one-fourth of
his salary). Upon receiving a third grade, the employee may be terminated. The rigorous
rules of article 45, which cover both on the job (e.g., revealing classified information) and off
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where a criminal offense may have been committed. Even in such
an instance, resort to a court is not really feasible, for the adjudi-
cation of a case can take several years.
Sound management of basically uneconomic investment proj-
ects cannot be viewed as a reasonable expectation. In Egypt,
there is no clear and established set of priorities for the evalua-
tion and selection of investment projects in the industrial sector.
For example, although it is continually stated that industry must
assist in reversing the adverse balance of payments situation, any
importance attached to this priority is preceded in importance by
the need to satisfy consumer wants. Thus, good management will
not reverse the outcome of the government's poor economic deci-
sions.
Since there are no real selection criteria for investment proj-
ects, even the social objectives are approached in an inconsistent
manner. Job creation is an avowed social objective. Accordingly,
one might expect strong advocacy of labor intensive projects. Yet
there is evidence of the use of technology that would be more ap-
propriate in a high-wage, labor-scarce economy than in Egypt,
with its relatively low-wage rates and plentiful supply of most
types of labor. Current plans speak of providing employment on a
substantial scale, but there is little evidence that employment
creation is a specific criterion of project selection or that a high
level policy decision has been made to use intermediate and other
labor intensive methods of production whenever possible.
Public sector companies provide a substantial amount of em-
ployment by carrying out government instructions to employ
more workers than needed and because of the difficulty of termi-
nating workers even for unsatisfactory performance or consider-
the job behavior (e.g., having another job if it will adversely affect his duties), increase the
probability that disputes over grading will arise under article 16.
An employee's violation of the rules of the company can lead to disciplinary action under
article 46, but no penalty may be imposed without a written investigation and a hearing
(article 47). Penalties, listed under article 48, include in increasing severity: reprimand;
wage cut for up to two months; suspension from work with half pay for up to six months;
exclusion from wage increases for up to three months; wage reduction in excess of two
months; downgrade in employee's position; downgrade plus wage reduction; and finally, ter-
mination.
Egypt's labor policy regarding the private sector also may present problems. Law No. 26,
1954 requires joint stock companies to retain Egyptians in 90% or more of the positions or
to pay 80% of the payroll to Egyptians, unless exempted by the Minister of Finance,
Economy and Trade (article 94). Further, article 96 requires that Egyptians who are
employed in Egypt must account for no less than 75% of the total number of employees of
corporations, or the payroll for Egyptians must be no less than 65% of the total company
payroll, unless exempted by the Minister.
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able decline in product demand. The improvement of enterprise
efficiency and the reduction of production costs would undoubt-
edly involve a significant reduction in the industrial labor force.
Since investment allocation decisions do not favor labor intensive
methods of operation but do favor certain highly capital intensive
projects, they do not contribute either to more productive employ-
ment opportunities or to the more equal distribution of income, to
the extent that it might have been possible. Therefore, Egypt's
tendency to overman public sector industrial enterprises must
compensate for the failure of its investment allocation process to
favor labor intensive projects. Such contradictions, in effect, lead
neither to the maximization of productive employment, to tech-
nological improvement, nor to the minimization of production
costs.
C. Toward a Redefinition of Law and Development
The situation in Egypt is not dissimilar to that of other coun-
tries that have been prone to use law as a means of initiating
broad and sweeping programs of economic and social change.
What is being recognized increasingly is that the use of more
stringent legal definitions is a totally inadequate means of rectify-
ing the problems that ensue from inadequate policy formulation
and from the poor and cumbersome administration of economic ac-
tivity. Precise legal language is no panacea for poor economic
planning and economic management.
The policy of economic liberalization in Egypt represents a sig-
nificant shift in the economic and social development strategy
which was pursued from 1952 to 1974. This shift imposes a variety
of demands and constraints on the policymaker charged with ef-
fecting this transition. The limited reentry of private enterprises,
domestic or foreign, onto the scene cannot be viewed as a primary
means of resolving the incentive and efficiency issues. An integral
part of these issues is the existence of the inappropriate legal
framework within which public enterprises are required to
operate. If this framework is left intact, the privatization of
limited industrial activities can have only a marginal effect.
Privatizing the economy, on the other hand, poses additional
burdens for the policymaker. Private investment is especially sen-
sitive to market incentives and to market prices. In Egypt, a deli-
cate balance of policies is essential if these market incentives are
to reflect social costs and benefits to the greatest extent possible.
In a situation where market signals are misleading as to these
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social costs and benefits- as is definitely the case in Egypt- it
cannot be clear what is expected of private investment.
As Egypt has implemented its new economic policy, it has been
decidedly unclear how the fundamental issue of protecting and
furthering social gains while stimulating new efficiency through
partial privatization of industry is to be effected.49 It is perhaps
axiomatic that the resolution to this complex issue requires both a
reexamination of the existing legal context and the formulation of
new laws which are consistent with the intent of the changed
policy. That process is taking place but, in a sense, getting the
new legal framework "right" has become virtually an exercise
unto itself. Accommodating the new law to the old, involving as it
does considerable compromise, and preserving social gain while
stimulating economic efficiency have so far merely perpetuated
the inconsistencies and contradictions.
In "An Economist's Preface" to Pozen's work on the legal
aspects of public enterprises, Anthony Killick asks, "if the re-
vealed defects of state enterprises are so universal, if they are
normally used to promote the particular interests of pressure
groups instead of public interest, if legislators and their legal ad-
visors are so powerless to remedy this situation, what then re-
mains the case for state enterprise?"5 Pozen suggests that law-
yers do not always ask the right questions or have simply focused
on the wrong questions. If he is correct, it follows that any legal
framework for public enterprise which is established without
"asking the right questions" is most probably doomed to elicit the
wrong response in managerial and, ultimately, corporate perform-
ance.
There is more than adequate evidence to support the view that
the legal framework in which Egyptian public enterprises, and
those of other Arab states, has not brought about the desired
results. This has not led, however, to the rejection of further legal
exercise as a means of attaining development objectives. The
Open Door Policy of Egypt is, after all, a legal redefinition of the
development strategy to be pursued in the coming decades.
Clearly, what is required is that the primary relationship be-
tween law and development which is assumed to exist, i.e., the in-
" For a further discussion of the policy conflicts inherent in this situation, see W. Wahba,
The Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries Under Joint Venture Arrangements
(with Special Reference to Egypt) 45-57 (1977) (unpublished research monograph, Center for
Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University).
" See note 4 supra, at xiv.
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ducement of behavioral change through legal change, is in need of
considerable re-examination. David Smith notes that "lawyers,
economists, and other development practitioners have often ig-
nored the impact of legal infrastructure on public enterprise effec-
tiveness, and lawyers, untrained in examining informal legal
systems, have not been attuned to unearthing the subculture of
legal systems that may facilitate or frustrate public enterprise
performance."'" He might have added that there is seldom suffi-
cient dialogue among and between the practitioners as well.
In the Egyptian context, this lack of understanding of the more
informal aspects of legal systems is particularly pronounced.
Although the new laws associated with liberalization provide a
sufficiently flexible framework for the facilitation of private in-
vestment, there has been very little inclination on the part of the
Egyptian bureaucracy to exercise its discretion or judgment in ap-
proving investment projects, especially those that may compete
with the public sector.2 Long versed in decision avoidance, the
same bureaucracy that has been found to impede past develop-
ment is now asked to take the initiative in restructuring the
character and direction of future development.
The extensive use of law and the legal process in the attempt to
foment change and growth necessarily has conditioned the large
bureaucracies, which have evolved in order to direct development
strategies, to avoid risk. In this respect, law has failed to take ade-
quate account of the rigidities which are induced by the use of
legal prescriptions for all economic and social relationships. This
is often the case even when the provisions of a particular law are
essentially correct, cover all contingencies and, ceteris paribus,
logically lead to the objectives for which it has been promulgated.
IV. CONCLUSION
Legal instrumentalism and economic policies which seek to wrest
from the public sector the qualities of initiative and efficiency have
been at loggerheads in the Middle East. The limitations inherent
in instrumentalism have in many cases been well documented by the
"' See note 5 supra, at 600-601.
52 The framework for foreign and domestic private investment in Egypt was established
by Law No. 43, 1974, as amended by Law No. 32, 1977. ARAB REPUBLIC oF EGYPT, THE
GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR INVESTMENT AND FREE ZONES, LAW No. 43 OF 1974 CONCERNING
THE INVESTMENT OF ARAB AND FOREIGN FUNDS AND FREE ZONES AS AMENDED BY LAW No. 32
OF 1977. Published officially in Official Gazette, June 9, 1977.
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law profession itself; Egypt is but one example of the potential
outcome of this type of legal exuberance.53
It is perhaps oversimplistic to conclude that the attempt at the
reintroduction of market determined prices and incentives in the
Egyptian economy is anathema to further legal instrumentalism.
However, the main failings of liberalization to date can be traced
in part to this continuing failure to recognize the limitations of law
in shaping societal or human behavior. Smith makes a compelling
case for the "reconstructed lawyer," one
who has recognized the need to examine the role of law in terms
of the interrelationships between society and economy on the
one hand and law on the other, and has also recognized that the
transfer of laws and legal institutions is fraught with peril
because we do not know enough about how law operates in
Western societies.
5 4
Few such lawyers have appeared on the post-liberalization Egyp-
tian scene, fewer still who can recognize the vital link between a
liberal economic policy and the requisite easing of the legal frame-
work so inimical to past development efforts. In the terms of one
scholar, "law and economics as scholarly disciplines would seem to
conflict in more ways than they complement each other."5
This is the essential point. "Economics ... logically positivistic,
scientifically rigorous . . . generally indifferent to normative
issues" and "law ... traditionally a morally oriented, mechanistic
system of dispute settlement which, by standards of economics,
generates apparently random results"5 have come together to
produce rather ineffective chemistry in the public sector in Egypt.
Economics seeks to predict future outcomes; law is far more con-
cerned with process than result.
The potential complementarity of law and economics is only
beginning to be acknowledged and explored in the United States.
It is essential that this process encompass and seek to analyze the
same potential complementarity in the developing countries. The
direct cross-cultural transfer of the methodologies and societal
" See Berg, Law and Development A Review of the Literature and a Critique of
"Scholars in Self-Estrangement," 25 AM. J. COMp. L. 492 (1927); Trubeck & Galanter,
Scholars in Self-Estrangement" Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development
Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062; J. Salacuse, Towards a Framework
for the Study of the Role of Law in Social Change, 18-20 (December, 1976) (paper presented
at the Aswan Workshop on the Sociology of Law).
u See note 5 supra, at 598-99.
5 H. MANNES, THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS, at vii (1975).
' Id
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processes of the industrialized nations to the developing world has
lost much of its attraction. Nevertheless, the dependency relation-
ship has not abated a great deal. If the impetus to put law and
economics in the proper perspective and combination is to begin in
the developing world, it most probably must begin first in the
Western (i.e., developed) world.
The reform of the public sector already begun in Egypt, and
most certain to follow in other countries soon, provides a unique
opportunity for more rigorous contemplation of the possibilities
for integration of the two disciplines. The alternative is neither at-
tractive nor likely to produce significantly different results than
have been achieved thus far by legal instrumentalism.
